Market Share and Price in Dutch Home Care: Market Power or Quality?. by Mosca, I. et al.
The Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) is the regulator of health care markets in the  
Netherlands. The NZa is established at October 1, 2006 and is located in Utrecht. 
The NZa promotes, monitors and safeguards the working of health care markets.   
The protection of consumer interests is an important mission for the NZa. The NZa aims 
at short term and long term efficiency, market transparency, freedom of choice for  
consumers, access and the quality of care. Ultimately, NZa aims to secure the best value 
for money for consumers. 
The Research Paper Series presents scientific research on health care markets and  
addresses an international forum. The Research Paper Series offers NZa staff and invited 
authors an opportunity to disseminate their research findings intended to generate  
discussion and critical comments. The goal is to enhance the knowledge and expertise 
on the regulation of health care markets.
This paper reflects the personal views of its authors, which are not necessarily those of 
their employers. This paper is not in any way binding the board of the NZa. 
Market share and price in 
Dutch home care:




















rMarket share and price in 
Dutch home care:
market power or quality?
Ilaria Mosca  
(NZa) Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit and TILEC/Tilburg  
University, The Netherlands
Marc Pomp  
(CPB) Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis
Victoria Shestalova  
(CPB) Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis






Samenvatting in het Nederlands  7
Abstract  9
1  Introduction  11
2  Institutional background  13
3  Data   17
4  Econometric analysis  21
4.1  Model  21
4.2  Estimation of the effect of market share   23
4.3  Controlling for complexity  25
4.4  Controlling for quality  27
5  Conclusions  29
References  31
Appendix 1: EMEA functions of care  33





The paper Market share and price in Dutch home care: market power or 
quality? is the seventh paper in the Research Paper Series by the Dutch 
Healthcare Authority (NZa). The Research Paper Series aims at the 
enhancement of the knowledge and expertise in the regulation and 
competition in healthcare markets. All paper in this Series are written by 
invited authors and/or NZa staff. 
A change of legislation in 2004 of the Dutch Exceptional Medical Expenses 
Act (EMEA) introduced more competition among suppliers of home care in 
the Netherlands. The 32 healthcare purchasing agencies are responsible for 
contracting suppliers selectively and for negotiating over prices and quality 
with providers of care. This legislation change thus created something akin 
to the internal market situation in the British National Health Service in the 
1990s. 
Our analysis, which considers the period from 2004 to 2006, shows that 
the outcome of negotiations is often at the regulatory maximum price (in 
roughly 30% of contracts). We investigate (1) whether this outcome is due 
to market power of care providers, and (2) whether purchasing agencies 
use their bargaining power to induce better quality rather than lower price. 
Our results lend support to the fact that a larger market share is indeed 
associated with a higher price. We also test for the complexity of the case-
mix and, although this correction leads to a slight reduction of the 
estimated effect of market share on price, it does not fully eliminate it. This 
supports the conjecture about higher market power of large home care 
providers. 
We also check the hypothesis that large providers deliver higher quality. 
The findings indicate that the relationship between market share and price 
remains after controlling for quality. This indicates that market power is 
likely the major explanatory factor for the observed price differences in the 
home care sector. 
Besides this interesting findings the paper provides two policy options: in 
the short run, to give stronger financial incentives to purchasing agencies, 
or imposing more efficient procedures to assign EMEA services to the 
clients. In the long run, insurers can take over the responsibilities of the 
purchasing agencies in contracting with care suppliers. Market share and price in Dutch home care: market power or quality?
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Samenvatting in het Nederlands
De contracteerplicht voor de extramurale AWBZ-thuiszorg is in 2004 
vervallen. Zorgkantoren kunnen nu zelf kiezen welke zorgaanbieders ze 
contracteren, en ze kunnen onderhandelen over de prijs en de kwaliteit van 
de zorg. In sommige regio’s is het aantal zorginstellingen beperkt. 
In deze regio’s zijn één of twee ‘dominante’ aanbieders die hun 
onderhandelingmacht zouden kunnen gebruiken om excessieve prijzen te 
bedingen. In dit onderzoek is nagegaan wat de invloed is van het 
marktaandeel van zorgaanbieders op de gecontracteerde prijzen met 
zorgkantoren. De gebruikte dataset bevat informatie over gecontracteerde 
prijzen en volumes in de periode 2004-2006. Onze resultaten tonen aan 
dat instellingen met een groot marktaandeel in een regio hogere prijzen 
weten te realiseren. Daarnaast vinden wij dat het effect van marktaandeel 
op prijzen zich niet bij elk zorgkantoor even sterk voordoet. 
Een alternatieve verklaring voor het gevonden verband is dat een groot 
marktaandeel en een hoge prijs beide worden veroorzaakt door 
kwaliteitsverschillen. We vinden echter geen ondersteuning voor deze 





A change of legislation in 2004 of the Dutch Exceptional Medical Expenses 
Act (EMEA) allowed for more competition among suppliers of home care. 
The new law made it possible for the 32 regional health care purchasing 
agencies to contract suppliers selectively and to negotiate over prices and 
quality. Since, at least in some regions, one or two providers dominate the 
market, there are concerns about the effect of providers’ market power on 
the pricing of home care services. This paper tries to assess whether these 
concerns are justified. Using complete data on contracted prices and 
quantities for 2004-2006, we find that, indeed, providers with a larger 
market share are able to contract at a higher price. We also find significant 
differences in contracted prices for some health care purchasing agencies, 
which point towards differences in their regional situations and/or policies. 
It is conceivable that both differences in market share and differences in 
price are driven by unobserved differences in quality. However, our 
analysis based on quality data reported in a consumer survey does not 





Long-term care is a policy issue of great relevance in the Dutch political 
arena. Traditionally, most academic research in this field has focused on 
institutional care at nursing homes. However, there has been a substantial 
increase in the use of long-term care delivered in the home care setting.  
An important paper addressing this topic is McKnight (2006), which 
analyses the effect of the change in the US Medicare reimbursement policy 
for the American home care market. 
This paper studies the Dutch home care market. A change of legislation in 
2004 of the Dutch Exceptional Medical Expense Act (EMEA)1 allowed for 
more competition among suppliers of home care services. The new law 
made it possible for the 32 regional health care purchasing agencies to 
contract suppliers selectively and to negotiate over prices and quality. 
Selective contracting could create incentives for providers to offer better 
services. Thus, the new law created something akin to the internal market 
in the British National Health Service in the 1990s2. 
However, it is not clear  that purchasing agencies have strong incentives to 
bargain over price and quality. The government sets an annual budget for 
contracting home care services for each purchasing agency, any unused 
budget must be returned to the government. Moreover, purchasing 
agencies may apply for additional funds if they run out of budget. All in all, 
purchasing agencies face only weak incentives for hard bargaining. Our 
results are conditional on this institutional feature of the market. 
Although the change in legislation was meant to create incentives to 
negotiate home care services at lower prices, it only achieved a minor 
improvement compared to the previous situation. The outcome of 
negotiations is often at the regulatory maximum price3 (in roughly 30% of 
contracts) or very close to it, while there was expected to be more room 
1  The Dutch term is Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten (AWBZ).
2  See e.g. Le Grand (1999) and Enthoven (2000) for a description of the British National 
Health Service and its internal market.
3  The maximum prices for all functions of care that purchasing agencies and suppliers can 
bargain over is set by the Dutch Healthcare Authority (Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit, NZa). As 
soon as the purchasing agency and the supplier have agreed on a tariff, this latter is 
submitted to the NZa that subsequently sets this ultimate tariff as the price for all clients of 
that particular supplier. Market share and price in Dutch home care: market power or quality?
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for price decreases.4 In this paper we analyse two major factors that may 
be responsible for this outcome: providers’ market power and quality.
Market power is a serious concern in the home care market. At least in 
some regions, one or two large providers dominate the regional market 
and there is ongoing concentration among providers in other regions. 
Especially large providers may be able to exercise market power in 
negotiation with the purchasing agencies responsible for contracting care, 
which produces a positive relationship between market share and the 
resulting price. 
However, another possibility is that a high market share and a high price 
are both the result of high quality. It may be that purchasing agencies use 
their bargaining power to induce higher quality rather than to lower the 
price (competition on quality). If purchasing agencies contract high quality 
providers, and if it is more costly to produce high quality, then this would 
also produce a positive correlation between market share and price. We 
test for this alternative explanation by including quality as a separate 
explanatory variable.
The paper is structured as follows. We will first explain the institutional 
setting and market structure in the provision of EMEA services (section 2). 
Next, we describe the data and the trends in the development of different 
market segments (section 3), after which we turn to the empirical analysis 
of the home care segment. Section 4 presents the theoretical model that 
motivates our empirical strategy and empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
4  Such an expectation is based on the evidence of the so-called ‘personal budget clients’. 
Instead of receiving ‘in-kind care’ from contracted providers, these clients get a budget to 
buy care themselves. The budgets are set at 75% of the amount based on regulated tariffs 
(CTG/ZAio, 2006, p.23). This implies that there must be a substantial room for cost 
reductions below the regulated tariffs. Yet, prices of contracted providers, especially in 




2  Institutional background
The EMEA came into force in the Netherlands in 1968. This insurance 
scheme covers the whole population for serious medical risks. The EMEA 
consists of long-term care (e.g. nursing homes), and all those treatments 
and services that cannot be insured individually because such expenses 
would be too high to bear, notably mental illness requiring prolonged 
nursing and care, and congenital physical or mental handicap. The target 
group for services provided under the Act has expanded a great deal and 
has become much more diverse over the past few years; it presently 
mainly comprises elderly people, the disabled, and mentally ill patients with 
chronic problems. Each individual is automatically insured for EMEA 
services via the basic health insurance policy, which is mandatory. The 
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS) decides on the financial means 
needed for this insurance.
Organisation of EMEA
The EMEA insurance delivers intramural (inpatient) services and extramural 
(outpatient) services. The main differences between intramural and 
extramural care are the following: 
Intramural services are delivered inside a medical institution, such as a 
nursing home, psychiatric clinic, etc. Intramural care involves more 
investment (e.g. in the infrastructure), it needs an extra licence for 
expanding the range of services, economies of scale are likely to arise, 
and only non-profit institutions deliver care. 
Extramural care relates to all services provided to patients living outside 
a medical institution. It does not involve a specific investment in 
expensive infrastructure, an expansion of a service (function of care)5 
can be arranged quicker and easier than intramural care because there 
is no need for an extra licence, there is a high concentration of firms in 
the market, and since January 2006 for-profit firms are allowed to enter 
the market.6
The focus of this paper is on extramural care. In the last years this sector 
has undergone several changes, which aimed to introduce market 
5  he products that are included in our dataset can be allocated into the following functions 
of care: house care, personal care, nursing, general supervision, activating supervision, and 
treatments. Please refer to Appendix 1 for a brief description of the above-mentioned 
functions of care. 
6  See NZa (2006).
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competition elements into the system.7 There are currently 800,000 people 
eligible for EMEA extramural health services. If a person wants to receive 
EMEA services he first needs an indication from the so-called Assessment 
Body8, whose task is to identify the right of each single individual to receive 
home care. Providers of care must have a legal permit to supply health 
care services9. Each single purchasing agency is in charge of buying the 
necessary amount of care for its own region. Figure 1 presents the division 
of the Netherlands in 32 regions.
Figure 1:  EMEA regions in the Netherlands
Source: Zorgverzekeraars Nederland (00)
Typically, the health insurance company with the highest market share in a 
region performs the role of purchasing agency in that region.10 However, 
health insurers are not at risk for health care services under EMEA. 
Instead, the cost of these services is paid out of a special fund for EMEA 
7  The most notable changes in the extramural EMEA sector are the following: introduction 
of selective contracting, possibility for clients to opt for a personal budget with which to buy 
care, introduction of functions of care to tailor consumers’ demands, providers defray their 
costs on the basis of which functions of care they have delivered. Moreover, in 2007 the 
function ‘house care’ (see Appendix 1) has been transferred to the municipalities. 
8  This Institution is called in Dutch Centrum Indicatiestelling Zorg, CIZ. 
9  This permission is released by the Centraal Informatiepunt Beroepen Gezondheidszorg, 
CIBG.
10  Some insurance companies have a high market share in more than one region. These 
companies have therefore control of purchasing agencies in different regions. 1
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services, which is filled by premiums paid by workers.11 Suppliers of EMEA-
care bargain with purchasing agencies over the amounts and the prices of 
care to be delivered. Contracts are negotiated on a yearly basis. 
Negotiations take place with the purchasing agency of the region in which 
the supplier is officially registered. It is also possible for suppliers to 
provide services to clients residing outside the purchasing agency’s own 
region. If 35% or more of all clients of a supplier come from a different 
region than the one where the supplier is officially registered, the 
purchasing offices of the concerned regions are jointly responsible for 
contracting such a provider, and they consult with each other about the 
financing of care. If 85% or more of all clients of a supplier come from 
another region, purchasing agencies can decide to delegate negotiations 
with the supplier to the purchasing agency of the region where the majority 
of its clients is situated (CTG-ZAio and CTZ, 2005b).
Responsibilities of purchasing agencies
Purchasing agencies have several tasks and responsibilities that have been 
agreed upon in a series of covenants with the Ministry of Healthcare, the 
umbrella organization for all insurance companies12 and the Health Care 
Insurance Board13.
Their main task – as already described above – is to purchase health care 
services in the right amount for satisfying the regional demand for home 
care. They thus act as monopsonists in the region. By means of their 
purchasing and contracting policies, purchasing agencies effectively set the 
amount and quality of the care contracted.14 They should be able to 
influence price, product development, and product differentiation. They are 
allowed to contract selectively and to set different requirements for 
different suppliers (CTG-ZAio and CTZ, 2005). Their social responsibility 
and reputation should provide them with the incentive to strive to 
negotiate the best deals for consumers. Therefore, in the bargaining model 
(section 4), we will assume that the agency tries to decrease the price as 
much as possible below the regulated tariff level.
11  This budget is called Algemene Fonds Bijzondere Ziektekosten, AFBZ. 
12  This is Zorgverzekeraars Nederland, ZN.
13  College voor zorgverzekeringen, CVZ.
14  Purchasing agencies must inquire the clients’ experiences concerning the health services 
they received. Therefore they observe at least some dimensions of quality and thus can use 
this information when selecting among regional providers. 
There are more arrangements safeguarding the level of quality of home care in the 
Netherlands. A specific law on quality makes the provider of EMEA services responsible for 
their own quality levels (ICM, 2005). The Inspectorate for Health Care (IGZ) checks whether 
each supplier complies with the minimum quality requirements set by law. Market share and price in Dutch home care: market power or quality?
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In general, purchasing agencies deliver so-called ‘in-kind care’, that is 
clients receive a care product instead of money to buy these services 
themselves. However, roughly 10% of recipients of EMEA services opted 
for having their own budget at disposal to purchase care themselves from 
the supplier they like most (see footnote 4). The number of such clients is 
increasing in recent years; people make their own choices and decide 
where to buy care themselves. This is partly due to the monetization of 
informal care (these clients do not have to use home care professionals, 
but can buy care from their neighbours, families and relatives).15 However, 
this can also be interpreted as a sign of dissatisfaction with the services 
offered by purchasing agencies.
In addition to the main task, purchasing agencies have to provide 
information to their clients about the content of a service provided by a 
supplier16 and to minimize waiting lists for their clients for particular health 
care services. They also must keep accounts (per client) of spending the 
financial means of the EMEA insurance and monitor client satisfaction.  
Funding of EMEA
Funding of EMEA services is arranged as follows: on the one hand 
purchasing agencies are reimbursed for the care services delivered by 
“their” providers (i.e. providers they have contracted), on the other hand 
they receive a fixed budget set by the Ministry of Health to cover their 
operation cost. Insurers incur excesses or shortfalls between actual 
operation costs and the budget. This structure creates an incentive for an 
insurance company to control the operation costs of its purchasing agency 
(NMa, 2004). The social responsibility of purchasing agencies should 
stimulate them to act in the best interests of consumers. Yet, the incentive 
to reduce the price of contracted care is weakened to the extent that more 
intensive bargaining with suppliers over prices of services involves higher 
operation costs. Note also, that the agency would always strive for 
concluding contracts with all the major regional providers because failing to 
conclude a contract with such providers would cast a negative image on the 
agency and the insurer (NZa, 2007), affecting the insurer’s position in the 
market for health insurance. Therefore, healthcare providers know they will 
get a deal with the purchasing agency and have thus no incentives to 
reduce the price. 
15  See Van den Berg and Schut (2003).




3  Data 
The dataset used in this paper contains data on contracted prices and 
quantities of extramural EMEA services in the Netherlands. These services 
include more than one hundred different products. The dataset covers the 
period 2004-200617 and contains 38210 observations in total (about 12000 
per year).18 The contracted prices and quantities result from negotiation 
between regional health care purchasing agencies and service providers. 
They cannot exceed maximum tariffs, set by the Dutch Healthcare 
Authority (NZa) at the national level. These maximum tariffs are also 
included in our dataset.
There are 32 regional health care purchasing agencies and about 1600 
service providers (1403 in our dataset) in the Netherlands. Each service 
provider negotiates its tariffs and quantities with only one regional health 
care purchasing agency. 
Table 1 shows the revenues based on regulatory tariffs and the revenues 
based on contracted prices. The percentages included in the table illustrate 
the difference between the regulated maximum tariffs and realised prices. 
Although there is a small decreasing trend in contracted prices relative to 
the regulated maximum prices and we observe a decline in the share of the 
contracts featuring maximum prices, there are still about 30% of such 
contracts. The average contracted price is just 6% below the maximum.
 
Our dataset covers 121 products. These products can be divided into two 
large segments, to which we refer as H and F in accordance with their 
official coding by the NZa19. The H-segment includes house cleaning and 
personal care, supporting and activating supervision, and nursing.  
The F-segment covers products that relate to mental health. Especially in 
the H-segment, contracted prices are close to the regulatory maximum 
price. The fact that prices in this segment lie closer to the regulated values 
17  This excludes unreliable observations (those with missing and negative values as well as 
the observations for one product where the data were not expressed in the same units for 
each years). The complete dataset contains also data on 2003. However, data on 2003 are 
not fully consistent with the rest of the sample, therefore we could not use them. Until 2004, 
there were no restriction on the total budget of each health care purchasing agency; 
therefore, the product volumes that they could contract in those years were unrestricted. 
However, since 2004, the budget room available for contracting has been capped. This 
produced a change in incentives of health purchasing agencies, affecting both quantities and 
prices. 
18  See Appendix 2 for the split by year.
19  The coding of products is in accordance with Circular CA-92. Market share and price in Dutch home care: market power or quality?
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than those in the F-segment allows for different interpretations. It is likely 
that the regulator has better insight in the cost level in the H-segment than 
in the F-segment. In fact, the regulator uses the results of benchmarking 
analyses to set maximum prices in the H-segment, while such analyses are 
not available for the F-segment.20 Another possibility is that purchasing 
agencies focus more on price in the F-market and more on quality in the H-
market.




Regulated maximum revenue (mln euro)  5972  6441   6371
Contracted revenue (mln euro) 5731 6094   6007
Contracted revenue as percentage of regulated revenue 
(%)
96%   95%   94%
Percentage of contracts featuring maximum price 53% 29% 25%
H-segment
Regulated maximum revenue (mln euro)  4570 4912 4794
Contracted revenue (mln euro) 4488 4745 4612
Contracted revenue as percentage of regulated revenue 
(%)
98% 97% 96%
Percentage of contracts featuring maximum price 71% 38% 34%
F-segment
Regulated maximum revenue (mln euro)  1402 1529 1576
Contracted revenue (mln euro) 1243 1349 1394
Contracted revenue as percentage of regulated revenue 
(%)
89% 88% 88%
Percentage of contracts featuring maximum price 10% 7% 2%
20  As from January 1st, 2007 the function of care “house care” has passed under the 
jurisprudence of a new law (WMO, Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning). This change 
brought uncertainty to healthcare providers because it was not explicit what would happen 
with their financial reserves. This might have influenced the contract relationship in 2006 
between healthcare providers and purchasing agencies, namely purchasing agencies 




Figure 2 reveals more details on price differences between the two 
segments. In particular, we do observe censored data for larger sizes in 
the H-segment, but not in the F-segment. With just a few exceptions, 
providers normally specialise in delivering either H- or F-products, which 
makes it possible to analyse these groups separately. 
Figure :  The relation between the market share and the relative price in the F- and 
H-segments (the upper row corresponds to the F-segment, and the lower row to the 
H-segment)
0, 2004 0, 2005 0, 2006
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4  Econometric analysis
We restrict our econometric analysis to the H-segment. The reason is that 
for the F-segment, defining regional markets is problematic. The service 
area of a provider does not always belong to one region, but may overlap 
with other regions. This is especially the case for mental care and handicap 
care (PWC, 2005), causing a bias in our data on regional market shares of 
the providers of these services (many of which are active in the  
F-segment). For home care, this problem is less severe. Below, we first 
describe the theoretical model motivating our empirical analysis, and then 
turn to estimation results.
4.1  Model
In a general bargaining model (Svejnar, 1986), the potential gain from 
bargaining is divided between the players that play a bargaining game. The 
gain is expressed as the sum of deviations of the players’ utilities  , U U i j ^ h 
from the disagreement payoffs  , U U i j ^ h:
. U U U U i i j j C = - + - ^ ^ h h   (1)
The bargaining outcome is the pair  , U U i j ^ h maximising the expression: 
, V U U U U




y Z 1 = - -
- ^ ^ h h   (2)
in which c, dependent on some factors Z, characterises the bargaining power 
of players.
This model has been applied in the health care context in order to analyze 
the outcome of negotiations between service providers and organisations 
contracting these services (such as insurers or health care purchasing 
agencies). See, e.g. Brooks et al. (1997) for applications to hospital-insurer 
bargaining. Here we apply a similar approach to analyse bargaining 
between EMEA service providers and regional health care purchasing 
agencies responsible for contracting these services in the Netherlands.
The value function is expressed by the equation:
, V P Q C Q R Q P Q
( ) ( ) y Z y Z 1 $ $ $ $ = - -
- ^ ^ h h   (3)Market share and price in Dutch home care: market power or quality?
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in which Q is the quantity provided, and C is the average unit cost and P is 
the price. If no agreement, there will be no production by this provider so 
that the profit will be zero, and ‘no success’ for the agency. Here we leave 
out of consideration fixed costs of providers and purchasing agencies (such 
as ‘the  reputation loss’). A simple rearrangement gives: 






( ) ( ) y Z y Z 1
$ $ = - -
-
b b l l   (4)
If we assume that the parties bargain only on price, and not on quantities 21,






C 1 c = - - b b l l   (5)
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, the average unit cost C 
does not depend on quantity.22 Introducing notations p=P/R and c=C/R for 
the ratios between the original variables, we obtain  
p c c 1 c = - + ] g   (6)
Here c represents the deviation of production cost from the regulated 
maximum tariffs and can be interpreted as the efficiency target set by the 
regulator; and c is bargaining power of the service provider. Since the cost 
is unknown, the above equation does not identify c and c separately. This 
means that we estimate the effect of market share on price rather than the 
effect of market share on the bargaining power of the provider. 
We assume that the bargaining power of a service provider depends on 
structural characteristics, such as the provider market share in the regional 
market, s, and the degree of market concentration, expressed by the 
regional Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, HHI s
2 / = . The provider market 
share s characterises the relative market position of the provider, and HHI 
relates to market conditions in general.23 
21  Brooks et al. (1997) use a similar model.
22  The interpretation of  the results remains the same  if we assume variable returns to 
scale. We comment on this point in conclusions (section 5).
23  Similar structural variables are included in the analysis by Melnick et al. (1992) and 




This leads to the following specification of the empirical model:
p s HHI s HHI 0 b b b f = + + +   (7)
Here the effect of structural characteristics on contracted prices p combines 
the effect of bargaining power and the effect of the regulatory estimate of R.
4.2  Estimation of the effect of market share 
The empirical model that we estimate is specified in equation (7). Market 
share of each provider is computed as his regional market share based on 
contracted quantities and regulated prices.24 In addition to structural 
variables included in that equation, we also include year dummies and 
regional dummies, to control for changes of the effects over the years and 
regional differences.
p s HHI D D s HHI year year region region 0 / / b b b b b f = + + + + +   (7a)
Since contracted prices are restricted by the regulated maximum tariffs, 
the revenues of providers cannot exceed the maximum revenues based on 
maximum tariffs. This means that the dependent variable (constructed as a 
ratio of contracted revenue and maximum revenue) is restricted by 1. OLS 
estimates would be biased in this case, therefore, we choose to use Tobit 
estimates, which are usually used for censored data. We also apply 
clustering by provider in our estimation. This procedure does not affect the 
coefficients but improves the robustness of their standard errors. 
Table 2 shows estimation results (see Regression 1). The results are in line 
with what we expected. They support the presence of a positive 
relationship between market share and price. The positive and highly 
significant coefficient for market share indicates that the price is an 
increasing function of market share in the relevant range. A market share 
increase of 1% translates into an increase of the relative price of 0.134%. 
See Table 3 (section 4.3) for additional illustrations of the effect of market 
share on relative price.
24  By using contracted quantities (instead of actual realised quantities) in defining market 
share, we lessen the potential endogeneity problem that may arise with respect to the use of 
actual quantities.Market share and price in Dutch home care: market power or quality?
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Table :  Tobit-estimation of the effect of structural characteristics on relative price, 
00-00 









assuming it does 
not change over 
time)
s 0.134*** 0.085*** 0.062** 0.055*** 








year2 -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.044***
year3 -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.044***
const 0.981*** 0.949*** 0.808***  0.711***
Number of 
observations




517 517 99  517
LL 1952 1986 823 1990
Chi2  387.4 399.4 185.3 411.3
Chi2 (regional 
dummies)a)
154.2 149.8 127.4 155.5
Note: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
a) Regional dummies were also included in regressions. Here we do not report the 
respective coefficients in order to safe space. Chi2 (regional dummies) corresponds to the 
test for their joint significance. 
The effect of HHI appears to be small and insignificant. This result holds 
even if we re-estimate the relationship excluding regional dummies (not 
shown here). Therefore, it is unlikely that the concentration itself is the 
reason for relatively high prices in some regions. The results of the 
Likelihood Ratio Test suggest that the inclusion of HHI does not increase 
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the explanatory power of the model.25 Omitting HHI from the model (not 
shown here) does not produce much change to the other coefficients and 
their t-statistics.
We have performed a number of specification tests for our model 
(Hausman test and the link test26). These tests accept our specification 
form. The proportion of censored data in the initial sample has appeared to 
be close to the proportion of censored data as predicted by the model.
4.3  Controlling for complexity
In order to assess whether the positive relationship between market share 
and price might be caused by other factors, we test for alternative models. 
One possible explanation for price differences across providers is 
differences in the complexity of their client base. If larger providers serve 
more difficult clients, then we can also expect them to charge higher 
prices. To some extent, this is already taken care of by differentiated 
pricing of different products (more complex services have higher prices). 
But it may still be the case that there is some dispersion in the cost of 
delivery of each product, which is driven by the client type. More care 
demanding clients may end up with large providers because such clients 
are likely to need a broader range of services. 
As can be seen from Figure 4, small providers often provide a limited 
number of products, while large providers typically have a broad range.
25  The result of the Likelihood Ratio Test shows that the regression without HHI is 
preferable to Regression 2 (LR chi2[1]=0.11, Prob > chi2 = 0.7369).
26  The former tests that the probit part and the truncated regression part have the same 
normalized coefficients, as implicitly assumed by Tobit; and the latter tests checks the 
potential misspecification of the functional form of the model (Pregibon, 1980).Market share and price in Dutch home care: market power or quality?
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Figure :  Number of functions and market share, 00-00
We test for the plausibility of this explanation by including the variable 
number of functions in the regression, which serves as a proxy for 
complexity. When defining the functions, we apply the same classification 
of allocation as used by the regulator (see Appendix 1). A positive 
coefficient reflects the effect of complexity of care on the final price. If we 
still find a positive and significant effect of market share on prices after 
controlling for this effect, then this will support our conjecture regarding a 
higher market power of larger providers.
Indeed, the estimation results (see Table 2, Regression 2) lend support to 
the argument that client complexity may be a factor driving the prices up, 
but it does not fully explain the existing price differentials between small 
and large providers. The effect of market share is still relatively large and 
significant. 
Table 3 illustrates the potential price differences as the result of the 
differences in market share, based on the results of our estimates in Table 
2. According to these estimates large providers who serve half of the 
regional market are able to charge about 4% more than small providers 











Table :  Price increase as the result of change in market share 
Increase in market share  5% 25% 45% 65%
Resulting price increase (regression 1) 0.7% 3.4% 6.0% 8.7%
Resulting price increase after correction 
for complexity (regression 2) 
0.4% 2.1% 3.8% 5.5%
Note that we also find significant differences in contracted prices for some 
health care purchasing agencies. To the extent that market share picks up 
market power, this must reflect other factors than relative bargaining 
strength. The negative coefficients for the year dummies indicate that 
relative contracted prices (as compared to maximum tariffs) decreased. 
4.4  Controlling for quality
Although we find a positive relationship between price and market share 
(and insignificant relationship with HHI), we cannot rule out that both 
differences in price and differences in market share are caused by 
differences in quality. For example, suppose health care purchasing 
agencies prefer to contract suppliers with high quality, and suppose also 
that it is costly to produce higher quality. Then this will result in a positive 
relationship between price and market share even if firms with high market 
share have no market power. 
In order to further investigate this possibility we need to control for quality 
in our estimations. However, quality data are not available for the complete 
sample, but for a smaller sample of providers. Therefore, we can control 
for quality differences for this restricted sample of providers. This will allow 
us to check for sensitivity of the estimates obtained in Regression 2 (see 
Table 2) to the inclusion of quality. Besides, it may give us some insights 
into the relationship between quality and prices, if the coefficient for quality 
appears significant.
In 2005, an independent research bureau conducted a survey among 
55,000 clients of 82 Dutch home care providers. The participants of the 
survey were asked to evaluate their care providers on different aspects of 
quality on a scale from 0 to 10. These evaluations were then aggregated to 
determine an integral quality score for each provider.27
Figure 5 shows a scatter of the available observations on quality and 
respective regional market shares of home care providers in 2005.  
The discrepancy in the quality scores is not very large.  
27  These data are currently publicly available on the website http://www.kiesbeter.nl.Market share and price in Dutch home care: market power or quality?
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The correlation coefficient between market share and quality is -0.40, and 
highly significant (p=0.0034), casting doubts on the argument about a 
superior quality of larger providers (at least for this sample). 
Figure :  Quality and market share (smaller sample, year 00)
Table 2 (Regressions 3 and 4) shows the results of regressions that control 
for quality differences. Since quality data are available only for one year, 
we first report the results including this year only (Regression 3), then the 
results (Regression 4) for the complete sample, based on the assumption 
that quality (or strictly speaking quality differences) does not change over 
time.
The findings indicate that the relationship between market share and price 
remains after controlling for quality. The coefficient for quality is positive, 
but insignificant. This precludes firm statements about the effect of quality 
on prices.






















This paper evaluates the effect of market share on contracted prices of 
regional providers of home care in the Netherlands and explains the 
observed price differences across providers. We focus on two alternative 
explanations for these differences: market power and differences in quality. 
Both explanations are plausible: on the one hand, large providers may be 
able to exploit market power by raising prices above competitive levels; on 
the other hand, price differences across providers may be driven by 
quality, if healthcare purchasing agencies are willing to pay for better 
quality. 
Our econometric analysis shows that, indeed, a larger market share is 
associated with a higher price. Since large firms typically deliver a broad 
range of functions, they maybe get a higher proportion of clients requiring 
complex (multi-functional) care, which in turn affects their prices. 
Therefore, we also incorporate a correction for client complexity. This 
correction leads to a slight reduction of the estimated effect of market 
share on price, but does not eliminate it. This supports the conjecture 
about higher market power of large home care providers. This 
interpretation remains valid even if bigger firms have higher costs (on 
which we do not have data). In a competitive market, only firms of optimal 
scale would remain active. If large, high-cost firms are able to pass on 
their costs in prices, then (ceteris paribus) this is evidence of a lack of 
competition.
However, there may be a second explanation for this finding that is 
unrelated to market power. Suppose larger providers deliver higher quality. 
If purchasing agencies prefer to contract high quality providers, and if it is 
more costly to produce high quality, then this would also produce a positive 
correlation between market share and price. Unfortunately, quality data are 
not available for the whole sample. Therefore, we can only check our 
hypothesis for a smaller sample. The findings indicate that the relationship 
between market share and price remains after controlling for quality. This 
suggests that market power, rather than quality, explains the observed 
price differences in home care. 
How could policy measures countervail this market power? As we explained 
in section 2, healthcare purchasing agencies must fulfil strict obligations 
with respect to the amount of care contracted for covering the region’s 
demand. However, the purchasing agencies lack financial incentives to buy 
this care efficiently since they do not bear any financial risk on the price of 
care they purchase from providers, while they do carry full financial risk on 
the operational cost of contracting and negotiating. This may be a reason 
why they prefer to deal with a limited number of larger suppliers rather Market share and price in Dutch home care: market power or quality?
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than with numerous small suppliers so that their transaction costs are kept 
down and their operation cost budget is not fully exploited. Also, there are 
no hard negotiations taking place between large care providers and 
purchasing agencies because not concluding a contract with large providers 
would cast a negative image on the agency and the insurer, affecting the 
insurer’s position in the market for health insurance. Therefore, healthcare 
providers know they will get a deal with the purchasing agency and have 
thus no incentives to reduce the price. 
From a policy viewpoint there are two possible solutions focusing on 
different time horizons. In the short run, one can think of stronger financial 
incentives for purchasing agencies, or imposing more efficient procedures, 
such as auctions, to assign EMEA services to individuals.28 An auction 
mechanism stimulates competition between bidders and allows sellers and 
buyers to gain from the service exchange, provided that quality is clearly 
defined, contracted and enforced.
In the long run, an option may be that health insurers take over the 
responsibilities of the purchasing agencies in contracting with healthcare 
providers. If health insurers are made to bear all financial risks associated 
with carrying out this task, then they will have an incentive to bargain for a 
low price, possibly using an auction scheme as outlined above. Moreover, 
health insurers operate on a larger regional scale than purchasing 
agencies. As a result, health insurers will have a stronger bargaining 
position. However, since insurers may appear to be more focused on prices 
than on quality in their choice of providers, the issue of quality may arise. 
It is possible that the market mechanism will safeguard quality, e.g. if 
consumers “vote with their feet” by switching insurers in case of low 
quality. However it is unclear whether this mechanism creates a credible 
threat, since consumers of home care may not be profitable for health 
insurers. In principle, a risk equalization scheme could be used to address 
the latter problem, but whether this is feasible in practice remains an open 
question. 
28  Since 2005 online auctions on postpartum services are taking place in the Netherlands 
via an internet website. This auction takes place between healthcare insurers and providers 
of care. The auction works as follows: The request for postpartum services is placed on 
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Appendix 1: EMEA functions of care
The EMEA insurance is currently subdivided in 7 functions of care 
summarised in Table A1. 
When an individual needs EMEA services he first has to be allocated to a 
function (or more) of care. 




1. House Care Activities related to house keeping, such as cleaning and 
tiding up. 
2. Personal Care Activities related to personal care such as help with 
showering, dressing up, and help with eating and drinking.
3. Nursing Medical care given to patients, namely injections, wound 
care, and drug administration.
4. General 
Supervision
Activities aimed at enhancing the integration of the 




Activities related to recovering individuals from psychologi-
cal illnesses, e.g., how to change behaviour in the society.
6. Treatments Activities aimed at curing diseases, e.g., revalidation after a 
stroke. 
7. Residency This is intramural care, when the patient needs to be placed 
in an institution because home care help would not suffice. 
Source: Decision on EMEA contracts,  October 00. 29




Appendix 2: Data issues
Here we give some more details on our dataset. Table A2 shows the split of 
data on contracted quantities and prices by year. 
Table A: The number of observations by year
2004 2005 2006
Total  12401 12935 12874
-segment H 8896  9394  9348 
-segment F 3532  3541 3536
Number of observations with price=regulated tariff 6659  3788 3284
-segment H 6308  3538 3214
-segment F 351 250 70
While for some providers we have only one observation on the contracted 
price and quantity per product for every year, for some other providers we 
have more than one observation per product for the same year. This occurs 
if negotiation has not been fully centralised at the provider level, but has 
been conducted by several separate units. About 7% of observations in our 
dataset correspond to contracts concluded by such units. The dataset does 
not allow us to trace these units over products. Hence we do not distinguish 
them as separate providers. Market share and price in Dutch home care: market power or quality?
The Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) is the regulator of health care markets in the  
Netherlands. The NZa is established at October 1, 2006 and is located in Utrecht. 
The NZa promotes, monitors and safeguards the working of health care markets.   
The protection of consumer interests is an important mission for the NZa. The NZa aims 
at short term and long term efficiency, market transparency, freedom of choice for  
consumers, access and the quality of care. Ultimately, NZa aims to secure the best value 
for money for consumers. 
The Research Paper Series presents scientific research on health care markets and  
addresses an international forum. The Research Paper Series offers NZa staff and invited 
authors an opportunity to disseminate their research findings intended to generate  
discussion and critical comments. The goal is to enhance the knowledge and expertise 
on the regulation of health care markets.
This paper reflects the personal views of its authors, which are not necessarily those of 
their employers. This paper is not in any way binding the board of the NZa. 
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